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To Be Remembered

There are to be remembered are these things:

1. This year's municipal contest is but part of a century-old struggle to free New York of a deeply rooted disease. Tammany is always Tammany—an organized appetite, which represents, and always has represented, a conspiracy of the few against the many. It is unreformable. During its long history it has never been identified with a single measure of public advantage. Scotch, it has never been killed. We grapple but once again with an ancient foe.

2. The bad Tammany of the past has developed into the worse Tammany of the present; for to Tammanyism has been added Hearstism. Tammany is now not merely selfish. To retain power it has drifted into relying on the stimulation of class animosities. Hearstism means the demagogic exploitation of natural human weaknesses and suspicions for the benefit of the exploiters. To vicious practices thus is added a new vicious principle.

3. Hymanism, which now expresses Tammanyism and Hearstism, is something that need create no surprise, in view of the forces behind it. To smite it is the duty of the hour, but a greater duty is to make it clear this community is forever through with the sort of government that it embodies. The voters of the city should look deeper than the record of the Hyman administration, black as it is, and set their faces against the further deliberate degradation of men and women.

Minority Tyranny

Secretary Hoover is right in saying that the public will not tolerate strikes "in which 2 per cent of the population may jeopardize the comfort and security of the other 98 per cent." He was thinking of railroad and coal miners' strikes, involving large bodies of men in many states. Their proportion to the rest of the community may rise as high as 2 per cent. But what can be said of the milk hold-up here, in which 11,000 workers are trying to prevent the delivery of a necessary of life to a population of about 8,000,000? The drivers are not a 2 per cent minority. They are a .0013 per cent minority.

This tiny fraction of the population of the metropolitan area went on strike because the milk companies refused to increase their wages \$5 a week. They are employing violence to prevent delivery of milk by other drivers. They put their own welfare above the welfare of the rest of us and want to coerce us all into paying more for milk on penalty of having to go without it.

Here is where the old-fashioned strike theory breaks down. In the early days of unions the notion prevailed that a strike was an affair exclusively between the employers and the workmen. The public was conceived of as an unconcerned bystander, likely to be more or less in sympathy with the strikers. The latter were to get their increased wages cut by the operators, and not out of the public.

But this pleasing fiction has long since been exploded. The public now sees that it must suffer the privations of a strike and also pay its cost. Excess labor charges in any field is a toll on the rest of the community. The public has therefore a primary interest in preventing and ending strikes which interfere with travel, or freight shipments or local food distribution. Those who cause the interference are making war on the orderly processes of life and business and must have a case which appeals to every conscience if they expect to enjoy any popular support.

Tiny minorities cannot be allowed to ride over great majorities. Leninism. When Americans de-

mand that majority rights be respected they are only practicing fundamental democracy.

Traction Promises

Whatever the source, any absolute pledge to establish and maintain a five-cent fare is a promise whose keeping is doubtful—necessarily doubtful.

There is not, nor can there be, any certitude. The fare must provide for operating expenses, whatever they are; for the supplies and materials, for maintenance and for a reasonable return on invested capital. Whether the ownership or operation is public or private, there is no difference. Advances from the public treasury may screen a discreditable fact, but such advances increase the fare in another way.

Ten years ago the traction companies entered into contracts which have proved unprofitable to them and to those they interested in their enterprise. It is possible to enforce these contracts until there is a 100 per cent loss. But in time the resources of the companies will be exhausted. What then?

Income must in some fashion equal outgo. By sloughing off unprofitable lines it is possible for selected lines to pay their way; but what happens to patrons of the divorced feeders? Operated alone and without meeting the deficits of the elevated lines, the subways at present can, perhaps, carry themselves. But with lease cancellation, what will be the effect on elevated lines?

If they charge more than the subways, then traffic will leave them. If they charge the same, then deficits will probably bankrupt them. If operated at all, it will be with slender service for their hundreds of thousands of users. If a five-cent fare does not pay, the burden can be shifted, but not escaped, and the public will pay.

The law that income must equal outgo already manifests itself. Formerly a genuine five-cent fare prevailed in this city. Now it does not. To meet the subway deficits the city budget annually carries an appropriation of \$12,500,000 to meet interest on subway bonds. This means that the actual subway fare is nearer seven than five cents.

On the surface lines there is a new charge of two cents for transfers. Where the traction break-up is complete the fare for a trip has become 10 cents, or 15 cents, and even 20 cents. Of all the frauds of the municipal campaign no one is more impudent than that the five-cent fare has been maintained.

Now, the future of traction income is unknown, and likewise the future of traction expenditure. It follows that no one is justified in making flat fare pledges. The most that can be pledged is diligent effort to keep expenditures down or income up to restore the five-cent fare, now nonexistent.

The McAneny plan seems to give a better promise of this than any other plan proposed. Mayor Hylan has no plan at all, and other plans have been prepared as part of stump speeches. Mr. McAneny and his colleagues at least have made a careful study and have attacked the traction problem from the side of eliminating waste and unnecessarily duplicated services. There is basis for hope in this, but in what else is there?

The Growing Drug Evil

Commissioner Copeland of the Health Department, admitting the ominous increase in the illicit drug traffic, pleads the baby act. The Commissioner tells the public, through the Hearst prints, that the "traffic is beyond control." The only hope is in higher powers—to wit, the Congress of the United States and the Parliament of Canada. "By a very simple procedure" they could "end the whole devilish traffic."

How? "By a simple enactment of law" prohibiting the export of opium and all its derivatives. Eureka! Let the sky fall; then we shall all catch larks! We have a law against the very smuggling which Dr. Copeland deplores, but it does not end the smuggling. There is no reason for his cocksure confidence that another law prohibiting export would be more efficient than the existing law prohibiting import. It is easier to smuggle stuff out of than into a country.

This appeal to the baby act by the New York Health Department is another admission of the inefficiency, the impotence, the demoralized administration—the "S O S" cry for national and international action in what is essentially a matter of local police jurisdiction. The Police Department does not seriously try to stop the drug traffic.

constructive plan for the abatement of the narcotic evil was evolved. But all that was brought to naught through the course of the Board of Health of this city. Under its system, as "The Bulletin of the New York Medical Association" says, "for the first time in medical history the victims of a disease awaiting medical treatment were made the objects of public exposure to sight-seeing occupants of rubber-neck wagons for their callous inspection. All this," adds "The Bulletin," "has been held on the best legal authority to be unlawful, yet it was allowed to proceed unchecked by the city government."

No wonder "The Bulletin of the New York Medical Association" declares that "only by the election of Henry H. Curran as Mayor over John F. Hylan can we bring this problem to his attention for a solution. The open-mindedness, the intelligence and the honesty of purpose of Henry H. Curran eminently fit him to undo the evil vicariously inflicted by Mayor Hylan in his administration of the New York City Department of Health."

King Canute Up to Date

Those who bow at the throne of the moving picture king will be filled with a vague alarm at this news of his having to take out snow insurance. Twenty-five thousand dollars will soothe his disappointment if Mother Nature fails to obey his command for snow before November 20. Divers affairs of state depend upon this storm, it seems, affairs of stars and contracts. Snow must be had, and snow being scarce in the neighborhood of Mamaroneck at this season the great one takes out an insurance policy.

Why such a confession of impotence? Does not the movie director command the rivers to stand still in their courses until his heroine is snatched from the rushing ice? Do not automobiles plunge into bottomless ravines, only to bear witness to the power of the film over the law of gravitation? The storms of winter never freeze and the tempests of summer never drench—beyond a becoming amount—the beloved of the master. Every loyal subject knows that no harm will come—to the right people—from the railroad wreck, the leap from the burning building, the collapse of the racing biplane. Is a snow storm so difficult a thing to achieve?

A real one, yes. Any amateur can produce gusts of fanned air and clouds of torn paper, but the greatest genius that ever filmed a melodrama cannot manufacture the tiny crystal stars that make a snowflake. There must be a free-will offering from old Mother Nature herself. And she is a temperamental old soul, given to showing pique when mortals assume too much. Wouldn't it be awful if she had been keeping a score on the undernourished and the unsmashed, and were about to exact a horrible vengeance of Indian summer upon David W. Griffith?

A wise man he to take out insurance against snow in November. If King Canute had only been up to date and had taken out wave insurance he could have watched the waves swirling around his robes without a shiver.

Buttresses of Peace

"The London Spectator," which for a long time specialized on belittlement of everything American, now holds that to make the Washington conference a success it is essential to bring together the two great world powers which use a common speech and whose political institutions are founded on common principles.


Most Americans, if there are to be special understandings, would have them triple instead of dual—would include France. Many would add Italy and other nations which have shown by self-sacrificing conduct that they merit confidence. Many would give a welcome to Japan, provided Japan expels from her national thought all selfish idea of becoming through force the Lord of the Far East. Moreover, it is American psychology to prefer, touching the manner of union, adhesions to principles rather than entry into ententes, even though the ententes merely concretely apply the principles favored. It has been the practice of our State Department to write identical notes rather than sign joint ones.

But now some sort of community of action between America and the British Empire is needed to secure peace and disarmament. Other things may be lacking and still a chance remain of restraining war, but what chance is there with latent hostility between America and the British Empire? If any one thing is to be put first an understanding between the two peoples is that one thing.

Thomas Jefferson, who penned the document which proclaimed national severance, later wrote that an open association with Great Britain would provide not only the best assurance of our own safety, but of all things

SPEAKING OF DISARMAMENT

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would most conduce to the spread of liberty everywhere. That passing years have not made the counsel archaic was attested the other day by President Harding, who, at Yorktown, in effect repeated the word of Jefferson.

For a long time, cherishing the memo of collisions best forgot or remembered merely as history, the two English-speaking peoples childishly made faces at one another. But thirty years ago, when the Venezuela controversy flared up, the British government, under Salisbury, apparently reached the conclusion that it had been foolish long enough.

Since then the doctrine that Americans are cousins, even brothers, has been a cult in Great Britain. History discloses few equal examples of persistent wooing of one people by another; but behind was more than a desire to flatter and to make use of America. The courtship was based on solid sense and perception of mutual interest. In the Near East Salisbury backed the wrong horse, as he confessed, but he had better luck to the west. The sensible improvement in British-American relations, which was due to British initiative, stiffened the British line in northwestern France when it almost cracked.

A reunion of the war-winning but peace-loving nations, with America and the British Empire the two buttresses of the arch of peace, does not menace other states. It does not mean a joint bullying of the universe. Rather it means the expansion of international law and new insurance against an upsetting of the world's equiservice by foolishly ambitious states.

That righteousness must be linked with power was a sound Roosevelt doctrine. China's intentions are good, but she is a liability rather than an asset in the world's balance sheet. Statesmanship must not only consider where righteousness resides, but where there is power. Except the twin be linked, any scheme of world association is vain. Special responsibility rests on the two English-speaking peoples. With them united good things can be added; with them divided why talk of disarmament?

So to the aspiration of "The London Spectator" Americans may well say "Amen." Those who would fan old discords are friends neither of America nor of general peace.

An Underrated Endurance

(From The Kansas City Times)
It is predicted that Germany just can't stand the loss of Upper Silesia, but then, it has been predicted that Germany couldn't stand a lot of things that it did.

And So On

(From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch)
The latest campaign is for the suppression of prohibition jokes. The next will be for the suppression of jokes on the suppression of prohibition.

Battleship in Modern War

There May Be Limitation of Armament if Conference Realizes Restrictions of Dreadnoughts in War Overseas

By Quarterdeck

There is little likelihood of limitation of armament and of reduction in naval appropriations unless the Washington conference is correctly informed as to the practical helplessness of the unsupported \$40,000,000 dreadnought in war overseas.

During the past year this subject has been repeatedly discussed in these columns. It has been emphasized again and again with quotations from the highest authorities at home and abroad that no nation could send its army or its battle fleet over seas unless it commands the air and the subsurface of the sea. In recognition of this fundamental fact it has been earnestly recommended in the interest of economy and national defense that we complete the battleships of the 1916 program that are far advanced in construction and that work be temporarily suspended upon all others. It has been stressed that we have neither modern submarines nor air forces—that our navy is out of date, that it cannot cross the sea, that it is a "helpless one-plane fleet in a three-plane naval era."

It is only during the last two months that the Navy Department has exhibited intelligent appreciation of the necessity for long range submarines and ample air forces. It has been fairly bombed into a state of semi-consciousness as to what constitutes a modern navy. But it still persists that the battleship is the "backbone" of the fleet and that we should continue with all speed to build dreadnoughts. In short, the Navy Department has led the world in a race for the most crushingly expensive and seemingly the least useful element of naval power.

Naval Experts

It is only natural that the Secretary of the Navy, the Administration, the press, Congress and finally the people at large should rely upon the judgment of the officers and boards on active duty at the Navy Department for the facts, the theories and the opinions upon which to base our naval policy. But it is nevertheless to be noted that there are officers of wide experience in our navy, active and retired—of wider experience than those at the department—who differ most decidedly in opinion from those who have guided the unfortunate policies of the Navy Department during the last three years. But these officers have been silenced or ignored despite the fact that recent events and a close study of modern naval weapons and naval strategy appear to completely sustain their contentions in opposition to the defiant conservatism of bureaus and department boards.

Advising Our Delegates

It has been announced that the experts at the Navy Department have been called into conference by the American delegation, presumably to outline a policy on limitation of armament.

It would be interesting to know what our experts have advised. Of course

this cannot be. It is strictly confidential. We can only surmise from our personal acquaintance with the individuals and from our knowledge of their attitude and expressed opinions during the past three years. Reviewing all this, and remembering the testimony given by them before the naval committees of Congress on our naval program, there is ample reason for fear that the departmental experts may have been too unimpaired of the lessons of the World War and of the obvious lessons and warnings to be derived from the recent bombing tests.

We can only hope that the Navy Department and its experts have even tardily and reluctantly seen the light of 1921, beyond the fog of 1916, in naval science. If they have, our delegates may receive the information and advice upon which to lead the conference in the adoption of measures that will give to each nation complete freedom in protecting itself and its interests upon the sea, while at the same time reducing the burden of taxation in cutting out the most expensive and the least useful forces in a modern fighting fleet. In fearing the worst let us hope for the best!

To Limit Armament

Let us come to the meat of the matter. There are three main points to guide us in limiting armament and in reducing war appropriations:

1. A correct estimate of the work of the submarine in the World War and of its potential power in the future.
 2. A correct estimate of air power in its future relation to sea power.
 3. Correct deductions from the World War as to the forces that will "command the sea" hereafter.
- Space forbids a repetition of the arguments and demonstrated possibilities regarding submarines and air forces in future war. The lay reader must have noted the overwhelming testimony as to these factors both in the World War and in the recent experiments in bombing the German ships and the Alabama.

In approaching the third subject—the "command of the sea" in future war—it is important to emphasize the current dangerous and absolutely false deductions as to the command of the sea in the World War.

False Deductions
It is asserted almost daily in the press and by individuals that the Grand Fleet of Great Britain commanded the sea! Strictly and broadly speaking, it did not command the sea! Admiral Sims demonstrated this fact in his book. The Grand Fleet commanded the surface of the North Sea; that is the only part of the sea it commanded. And we must remember that while it commanded this small part of the sea, blockading the German fleet, the German submarine nearly won the war by starving England, and that, too, despite the combined navies of the civilized world! Commanding the sea, then, as far as battleships are concerned, may avail nothing in war. It is admitted by British admirals, even

by those who cling to the battleship, that Germany would have won the war had she concentrated on submarines from the start.

The geographical situation of Germany and England is responsible for the false deduction as to the power of the battle fleet of any nation to "command the sea" in future war. Geography blockaded Germany. It was not Britain's Grand Fleet. Germany had but two openings through which to reach the sea. In commanding the surface of the North Sea alone the Grand Fleet prevented the exit of the High Seas Fleet and also prevented the German cruisers that were at sea when the war began from getting home. They were soon cornered and destroyed.

This astonishing failure to realize the governing influence of a special geographical situation has given rise to the absurd and perilous theory that a Grand Fleet of \$40,000,000 dreadnoughts can blockade a coast or command the sea in war across an ocean. Could Britain's Grand Fleet blockade our coast? Could Japan's fleet blockade us? Could our battle fleet, even if the 1916 program were completed, blockade the Japanese coast? Geography does not help in such cases—it positively prevents the blockade of a coast beyond seas. What, then, will our battle fleet do in modern war? Where will it go? How long can it remain away from home? Where will it be safe? Will it fight a battle?

Battleships Overseas

An article by Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, of the British navy, in "The Nineteenth Century" magazine for September contains valuable information on this subject. Our experts should read it. We quote:

"In the great war our geographical position enabled us to prevent the enemy's battle-cruisers getting out and clearing the seas of our merchant ships and their protecting cruisers. The exit to the open sea through the Straits of Dover and down the Channel was too hazardous. The only other way left for the Germans to use was round the north of Scotland; but in order to clear this passage the Grand Fleet had first to be disposed of."

"Let us next consider the problem of obtaining command of the ocean when the bases of the opposing fleets are far apart."

"What will happen? Will the seeker after battle send his battle fleet across the ocean to an enemy's coast that is 2,500 miles away from his base? Let us suppose for a moment that he embarks on this rash adventure."

Admiral Kerr then assumes, quite correctly, that the nation on the defensive would not obligingly and foolishly send its fleet to stage a ring battle in the middle of the Atlantic or Pacific.

"There is no battle fleet to fight, there is no harbor to re-fuel. The fleet must be kept steaming at speed at all times and in all weather, with its guards of destroyers around it. Everybody has to keep his eyes skinned at all times looking out for attacks from air, sea and under water."

"I have spoken to several admirals, and I have not found one who would like to undertake the job."

"As blockading by big ships has been shown to be impossible in the face of modern flotillas, it would appear that there is no use for the battleship when the bases are far apart."

"If the above statements and arguments are correct the deduction is clear. Battle fleets are only of use in certain geographical divisions where the bases are not far apart. They are of no use for wars in which the combatant countries are separated by thousands of miles of ocean! The command of the great oceans has passed from the battleship, and in future must be obtained by great strength in flotillas at the points where the routes touch the land and where their termini are."

"We have at present sufficient battleships for any eventuality in Europe; if they are of no use in other places we should not spend a single penny more on them."

Comment is superfluous. If our "experts" and the conference realize the truth—if they are awakened to the demonstrated fact that battle fleets are of little value in aggressive war overseas, the race for useless and crushingly expensive armament may stop and the burden of taxation may be lifted.

This is the key—the only key—to success in limiting armaments. Common sense, not blind conservatism, must rule in the final analysis—otherwise there will be dismal failure.

An Intolerant Crowd

To the Editor of The Tribune:
Sir: For a number of years past my friend Edward A. Packer, a public-spirited citizen, now over seventy years of age, an accomplished speaker of un-failing courtesy, has been accustomed from time to time to speak on prohibition in Wall Street.

He had never been molested until a few days ago, when certain rowdies, perhaps encouraged by his years and being fortified by their numbers, broke up his meeting and compelled him to leave the street.

It was a rather disgraceful affair, happening almost under the shadow of the statue of Washington and on a street whose occupants should be the foremost supporters of law and order, and particularly as Mr. Packer's talk was in support of a part of the Constitution of the United States, approved by a great majority of the states, as well as of the people of the whole country.

CHARLES E. MANIERE.
New York, Nov. 3, 1921.

A Week of Verse

Autumn

(From Contemporary Verse)
THE leaves have changed to butterflies
That beat their wings against the
skies,
Then flutter through the sparkling air
To fling their beauty everywhere.

The hills are each a leaping flame
That makes the sunset blush for shame
And e'en the lowly wayside clod
Unfurls its flag of golden-rod.

VIVIAN YEISER LARAMORE.
(The following poems are from the first issue of "Broom," a new international magazine of the arts, published by Americans in Italy, edited by Harold A. Loeb and Alfred Kreyenborg.)

Lake

THERE'S too much selfhood in this lake:
Though, varying, four streams partake
In amber rushes till they break
When softening confusions shake
Identities into the lake.

I know the four streams, all their ways:
I've paddled in their amber sprays
And flung them into bubbled praise
Of sunlight; but I see too well
The lake complacently will tell
Only selfhood, nor admit
How four streams engendered it.

Chinese Poems of J. Wing
YOUR childhood is a gold hill,
There is a sheer fall from it
Into the cloudy, monotonous sea.

You dance high in a small blue vesture,
With white arms catching at the sky
And feet hardly touching the gold earth.
You dance swift and sweet and warm
To the edge and back again.

I have painted abominable devils
For your great delight,
Yellow apes with alligators' heads
And scarlet spots; blue mouths.

But now that you demand
A picture of ourselves playing together,
What shall I put down?

A band of cherry-colored fire
Across black paper?

A purple flag-flower, I looked down
Into the water of your soul,
A silver trickle in the hills.

You wooed down to you and caught
One of my leaves.

I am splintered maw
Of green and water and mauve
Eaten by the black teeth of the rocks.

My mind was an ivory box
Before you came;
Carved with sayings,
Holding a scentless pellet
Of green burning-gum.

But now
Half the sweet is filled
With the sweet, eternal smell of pain,
And the box is empty.

Translated by E. POWYS MATHER.

Hospital Nights

THE Salvation Army lass
Lay very still all day.
Her body seemed to depend from her eyes—

Eyes eager-blue as marbles
That have rolled in many gutters,
Yet stayed miraculously clean.
Now her hands monotonously
Scoop up the shallow moonlight,
Pale as weak lemonade,
That spills through her fingers
Over the white sheet.

The moon is of little account here,
With that strong light in the corridors.
Now over the Battery—
All the bay to herself
And Sunday boats coming in—
The moon'll be bright as Jesus
Walking upon the water.

LOLA RIDGE.

The New Broom

WHEN you are sweeping us
With your cosmic broom
Sweeping us out of mouldy rooms
Sweeping us clean and sweet—

Remember
When we're quivering—
Sensitive—bare—
We shall be grateful
For just a few shadows.

DAVID O'NEIL.

Ghost

(From The New Republic)

I'M comin' back and haunt you, don't
you fret.
What if I get as far as Hell away?
They're things of me that just can't
help but stay—

Whether I want or not, you can't forget.
Just when you think you got me wiped
out clear,
Some bird that's singin'—moonlight on
a hill—

Some lovely thing 'll hurt like it would
kill,
And you'll hear somethin' whisperin',
'He's here!'

And when somebody holds you close, like
this,
And you start in to feel your pulse
race,
The face that's pressin' yours'll be my
face . . .

My lips'll be the ones your lips'll kiss.
Don't cry . . . which do you think
it'll hurt most?
Oh, God! You think I want to be a
ghost?

JOHN V. A. WELVER.